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Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information
acquisition process. In every period, the agent can acquire costly information that is
relevant to the principals decision. Each signal may or may not provide denitive
evidence in favor of the good state. Neither the agents e¤ort nor the realizations of
his signals are observable. First, we assume that the agent has no private information
at the time of contracting. Under the optimal mechanism, the agent is rewarded only
when his messages are consistent with the state. The payments that the agent receives
when he correctly announces the good state increase over time. We then characterize
the optimal mechanisms when the agent has superior information about the state at
the outset of the relationship. The principal prefers to o¤er di¤erent contracts if and
only if the agent types are su¢ ciently diverse. Finally, all agent types benet from
their initial private information.
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1 Introduction
In many situations the power to make a decision and the ability to acquire relevant
information do not reside in the same place. Firms, and more generally, decision makers,
routinely consult experts who spend time and energy to determine the best course of actions.
Consider a pharmaceutical company developing a new drug for a certain disease. Before
starting to sell the drug, the company wants to know if the drug leads to a side-e¤ect which
makes it inappropriate for patients with some condition (for example, high-blood pressure).
Producing the drug is always advantageous, but informing the public about side-e¤ects is
desirable to avoid legal complaints. The company signs a contract with a team of scientists
to perform experiments and assess the possibility of this side-e¤ect. Because of physical
constraints, the scientists cannot test more than a xed number of patients at a time. When
they report evidence of a side-e¤ect, the company stops the testing procedure and starts
selling the drug, warning the patients about the possible consequences of taking it. On the
other hand, if the scientists do not nd evidence of a side-e¤ect after a certain number of
tests, the company sells the drug with no warning.
A number of features are important in this example. First, the information acquisition
process is dynamic. Physical or technological constraints impose limits on the number of
patients that a laboratory can test in a given period, say a week. Hence, it may take several
months before the scientists either nd evidence of a side-e¤ect or they recommend to quit
the testing process. Second, the pharmaceutical company may lack the means or knowledge
to monitor the team in performing the tests. In particular, the scientists may choose to
save the cost of performing the tests and announce that the drug does (or does not) lead
to a side-e¤ect. Finally, the pharmaceutical company and the team of scientists may not
be equally informed at the beginning of their relationship. Because of their past experience
conducting similar experiments, the scientists may know facts that the company ignores
or they may interpret the public information in a more sophisticated way. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that they start the testing process with superior information.
In spite of the presence of various forms of informational asymmetries, a principal can
still motivate an agent to invest in information acquisition and share his discoveries if after
the principal makes a decision, some information becomes publicly available. In the above
example, the presence or absence of side-e¤ects will become evident after the drug is on
the market for some time.
The goal of this paper is to study how the principal can use this information to overcome
the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection present in this context. In particular,
we analyze a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the principals optimal
contract. We also investigate how the di¤erent sources of private information a¤ect the
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agents ability to extract a rent from the principal.
In the benchmark model, a principal who has to make a risky decision hires an agent to
acquire information about the unknown state of the world. The state can be either good or
bad. The principal and the agent are equally informed at the outset of the relationship. The
agent can complete at most one test in every period and each test generates an informative
(binary) signal about the state. One realization of the signal can be observed only when
the state is good, while the other realization is possible under both states. Neither the
agents e¤ort nor the signals are observable (or veriable). After the principal makes his
decision, the state is revealed.
The principal has the ability to commit to a contract which species both the length
of the relationship and all the possible payments to the agent. The payments depend on
the messages that the agent sends to the principal and on the state of the world. The
agent is protected by limited liability and cannot make transfers to the principal. The
principal chooses the contract to maximize his expected payo¤. His goal is to determine
the optimal length of the relationship and to o¤er the cheapest contract that induces the
agent to acquire the signal and reveal it truthfully in every period until the deadline or
until the agent nds denitive evidence in favor of the good state, whichever comes rst.
We solve the principals problem in two steps. First, we x the deadline and construct
the optimal contract with a given length. We then study the optimal length of the re-
lationship. An incentive compatible contract must prevent di¤erent types of deviations.
In particular, the agent may lie about the realizations of his signals. By controlling the
release of information, the agent therefore decides when to terminate the relationship with
the principal. If later payments are su¢ ciently generous, the agent may decide to delay
the announcement of a major nding. Furthermore, the agent can choose the pace of his
testing in the sense that he can shirk in one or several periods. This leads to asymmetric
beliefs about the state. To see this, consider the following deviation. Suppose that in a
certain period the agent shirks and claims to have evidence in favor of the bad state. Being
unaware that the agents message carries no informational content, the principal updates
his belief. Consequently, his belief that the state is good is lower than the agents.
We characterize the optimal contract with a xed length. The agent is rewarded only
when his messages are consistent with the state. The payments that the agent receives when
he correctly reports the good state increase over time. As time passes, the agent becomes
more pessimistic about the arrival of evidence in favor of the good state. Consequently,
larger payments are necessary to motivate him to exert e¤ort. At the same time, the
discounted values of these payments are decreasing over time. This induces the agent to
announce the good state as soon as he nds denitive evidence in its favor.
We show that the agents information rent can be decomposed into two components.
2
The rst component is due to the presence of moral hazard, i.e. the fact that the prin-
cipal cannot monitor the agents e¤ort. The second one is due to the presence of hidden
information, i.e. the fact that the results of the tests are unobservable.1 We investigate
how the various parameters of the problem a¤ect the two rents. In particular, the moral
hazard rent is increasing in the quality of the signal, while the hidden information rent is
decreasing. When the signal becomes more precise the agents belief that the state is good
deteriorates more quickly over time, leading to larger moral hazard rents. On the other
hand, when the precision of the signal is high it is very risky for the agent to guess that the
state is good, leading to lower hidden information rents. Consequently, the model predicts
a non-monotonic relationship between information rents and signal precision.
Next, we endogenize the length of the relationship and allow the principal to choose
the deadline. We show that the optimal deadline is (generically) unique and that agency
problems shorten the information acquisition process.
In the second part of the paper, we analyze the case in which the agent has superior
information about the state at the time of contracting. For tractability, the agent has one
of two types. The agents type represents his belief that the state is good and can be either
high or low. We also assume that the length of the relationship is exogenous and equal
across types. We derive the optimal contract and disentangle the agents information rents
into three components due to moral hazard, hidden information and adverse selection.
In contrast to many models of adverse selection in which the principal is able to extract
all the rents from a certain type (see, among others, Mussa and Rosen (1978), and Baron
and Myerson (1982)), in our model both types strictly benet from the fact that their initial
type is private information. The additional rents of the two types are of di¤erent nature.
The low type obtains a larger payment when the state is bad while the payments in the
good state coincide with the payments of the optimal contract in the benchmark model.
On the other hand, the payments to the high type are front-loaded and distorted upwards
when the state is good.
Our paper has elements in common with both the literature on learning in dynamic
agency and the literature on delegated expertise. Within the former literature, Bergemann
and Hege (1998, 2005), and Hörner and Samuelson (2010) are particularly related to our
work. These papers study the dynamic provision of venture capital when the quality of
a project is unknown to the entrepreneur and to the venture capitalist. The successful
completion of the project depends both on its quality and on the nancing it receives. The
1We follow Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and use the term hidden information to emphasize the
fact that the informational asymmetry about the realizations of the signals arises after the contract is
signed. In contrast, in standard models of adverse selection the agent is privately informed at the time of
contracting.
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information structure is similar to ours. Either the project is completed or the parties
become more pessimistic about it. Our paper is di¤erent in two important aspects which
reect the nature of delegated expertise problems. First, we assume that the realization of
the signal acquired by the agent is private information. Hence, the principal must provide
incentives to the agent to reveal his information. Furthermore, we investigate the possibility
that the agent has superior information at the time of contracting.
Within the literature on delegated expertise, La¤ont and Tirole (1986) analyze a static
delegation model in which the agent has superior information at the time of contracting.
Lewis and Sappington (1997), and Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998) consider costly in-
formation acquisition. Gromb and Martimort (2007) derive many insights by studying
optimal contracting with many agents when they can collude with one another. Our paper
di¤ers from these papers because we focus on the interplay between information acquisition
and dynamics, which is not central to these models. Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) study a
dynamic delegation model in which the principal o¤ers short-term contracts to motivate
the agent to search for innovations. Their main insights are related to the ability of the
agent to conceal discoveries, slowing down the learning process. In our model, the agent
also wants to manipulate the belief evolution of the principal, but concealing discoveries
does not play an important role.
Our paper is also related to the literature on dynamic expertise. Olszewski and P¾eski
(2010) and Klein and Mylovanov (2010) analyze models in which the expert has private
information about the precision of his signal. The principals goal is to keep the experts with
high precision and release the other ones. Our work di¤ers from theirs since we focus our
attention on costly information acquisition and abstract from informational asymmetries
about the experts precision. Manso (2010) studies how to optimally motivate an agent to
work on tasks of unknown payo¤s. His work focuses on the tension between exploitation
and exploration (absent in our model), while we focus on dynamic incentives for information
acquisition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the benchmark model and
characterize the optimal mechanism with a xed length. In Section 3, we investigate the
optimal length of the relationship. In Section 4, we extend the analysis to the case in which
the agent has private information at the outset of the relationship. Section 5 concludes.
All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model with Symmetric Initial Information
A risk neutral principal has to choose one of two risky actions: A = B;G: The payo¤
U (A; !) of each action depends on the binary state of the world ! 2 fB;Gg. The principals
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preferred action in state ! = B;G is A = ! : U (G;G) > U (B;G) and U (B;B) >
U (G;B) : The prior probability that the state is ! = G is p0 2 (0; 1).
In period 0 the principal hires an agent to perform a number of tests. In this section,
we assume that the agent has no private information at the outset of the relationship.
The agent can perform at most one test in each period. Performing a test is costly
and we let c > 0 denote the cost of a single test. Every test generates an informative but
noisy signal s about the state. The signal takes the value s = B;G and has the following
distribution:
Pr (s = Gj! = G) = ;
Pr (s = Gj! = B) = 0;
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the quality of the signal. Thus, signal G provides denitive
evidence in favor of state G: Conditional on the state, the signals are independent across
periods.
For every t = 0; 1; : : : ; we denote by
pt =
p0 (1  )t
p0 (1  )t + 1  p0
(1)
the agents belief that the state is ! = G if he observes t signals equal to B:
The two actions of the agent are denoted by e (acquiring the signal) and ne (not acquir-
ing the signal). The agents e¤ort decision (whether he chooses e or ne) and the realization
of the signal are not observable. The state of the world is revealed after the principal
makes his decision. The principal can commit to a long term contract (or mechanism) w;
specifying sequential payments to the agent that are contingent on the agents messages
and on the state of the world (of course, a payment may depend on the state only if it is
made after the principal chooses an action A = B;G and the state is observed).
In this section, we assume that the length of the contract T > 2 is xed,2 and we
analyze the optimal length of the relationship in Section 3. The objective of the principal
is to design the optimal mechanism, i.e. the cheapest contract w that induces the agent to
exert e¤ort and reveal the realization of the signal in every period t = 0; : : : ; T   1, until
he nds denitive evidence s = G in favor of state G. In this case we say that the contract
is incentive compatible.
The agent is risk neutral and has limited liability in the sense that the principals pay-
ments must be non-negative. For simplicity, we assume that the agent has zero reservation
utility. Both the principal and the agent have the same discount factor  2 (0; 1] :
2We consider the case T = 1 in Section 3.
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We now turn to a formal denition of a contract. To keep the notation as simple as
possible, we begin with a few observations. First, recall that the contract is designed to
give incentives to the agent to exert e¤ort in every period (until he observes signal G). It
is therefore without loss of generality to assume that the set of messages available to the
agent in every period is fB;Gg :3
Second, we say that a contract is evidence-based if the principal makes a payment to
the agent only when the relationship ends and the state is observed. As already mentioned,
this happens as soon as the agent announces message G or in period T   1 if the agent
announces message B in every period. In other words, in an evidence-based mechanism all
the intermediate payments (i.e., the payments that take place before the principal makes a
decision) are equal to zero. Of course, the nal payments of an evidence-based mechanism
may depend on the realized state.
In our model, the principal and the agent are risk neutral and share the same discount
factor. Given these assumptions, we can always construct an optimal mechanism that is
evidence-based. Intuitively, consider a mechanism that species an intermediate payment
x > 0 in period t < T   1: Suppose now that the principal sets the intermediate payment
equal to zero and increases all the nal payments in period t0 = t + 1; : : : :T   1; by the
amount (1=)t
0 t x. That is, he takes away the intermediate payment from the agent and
gives it back with the interests at the end of the relationship. Clearly, both the principal
and the agent are indi¤erent between the two mechanisms.
Finally, suppose that the agent announces message G and the state turns out to be
B: This event can occur only if the agent deviates and lies about the realization of his
signal. Thus, it is without loss of generality to inict the hardest punishment possible on
the agent. Since the agent is protected by limited liability, this corresponds to setting the
corresponding payment equal to zero. We say that a contract is extreme if all the payments
that take place when the state is B and the agent reports message G are equal to zero.
In what follows we restrict attention to the class of evidence-based and extreme con-
tracts.4 To simplify the exposition, we refer to them simply as contracts (or mechanisms).
Formally, a contract w is the collection of the following payments:
w =

(w (t))T 1t=0 ; w (G) ; w (B)

:
Recall that the contract reaches period t > 1 only if the agent announces message B in
3Consider an arbitrary incentive compatible mechanism and letMt  fB;Gg denote the set of available
messages in period t = 0; : : : ; T   1. Consider now a modied mechanism with the set of messages fB;Gg
in every period and with payments equal to the corresponding ones of the original mechanism. Clearly, the
modied mechanism is also incentive compatible. This is simply because the set of deviations is smaller
under the new mechanism than under the original one.
4We will briey come back to this point at the end of Section 2.1.
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every period t0 < t: For t = 0; : : : ; T   1; w (t) is the payment that the agent receives in
period t if he announces message G and the state is G: For ! = B;G; w (!) is the payment
that the agent receives in period T   1 if he announces message B and the state is equal
to !:
To sum up, we analyze the following game. In period 0 the principal o¤ers a contract
w: Because the agent has zero reservation utility and limited liability, the participation
constraints are automatically satised and the agent accepts the contract. Then, in each
period the agent decides whether to exert e¤ort (action e) or not (action ne) and sends a
message from the set fB;Gg : The game ends either when the agent announces message G
or in period T   1 if the agent always reports message B:
We can now dene the agents strategies. In every period, the agent observes the
private history of acquisition decisions and signal realizations as well as the public history
of reports. Clearly, there is only one public history that is relevant in period t: This is the
history in which the agent announces message B in every period t0 < t: We can therefore
restrict attention to private histories (and ignore public histories).
Consider an arbitrary period. If the agent exerts e¤ort then he can either observe
signal B or signal G: On the other hand, if the agent shirks we say that he observes ne
(his decision). Thus, for any t > 0; H t = fne;B;Ggt is the set of private histories at the
beginning of period t (or, equivalently, at the end of period t  1). We set H0 equal to the
empty set.
We let  denote an arbitrary (pure) strategy. Formally,  =
 
At ; 
M
t
T 1
t=0
; where
At : H
t ! fe; neg ;
Mt : H
t+1 ! fB;Gg :
A strategy has two components: the action strategy and the message strategy. The
rst component
 
At
T 1
t=0
species the agents decisions at the information acquisition stage.
The second component
 
Mt
T 1
t=0
maps the private histories of the agents into reports to
the principal. We let  denote the set of strategies available to the agents.
We denote by  the set of strategies under which the agent acquires the signal and
reveals it truthfully in every period (on path). Formally,  is the set of all strategies 
such that: (i) A0 = e; (ii) for every t > 0
At (B; : : : ; B) = e;
and (iii) for every t > 0 and every s = B;G
Mt (B; : : : ; B; s) = s:
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Given a contract w, we let u (; p0;w) denote the agents expected utility in period 0
if he follows strategy .5 Clearly, if  and 0 are two strategies in ; then u (; p0;w) =
u (0; p0;w) : With a slight abuse of notation, we let u (w) = u (; p0;w) with  2 :
Then the principals (linear programming) problem is given by
min
w>0
u (w)
s.t. u (w) > u (; p0;w) for every  2 :
(2)
A contract is incentive compatible if it satises all the constraints in (2). The optimal
contract is the solution to the above problem.
2.1 The Optimal Mechanism with a Fixed Length
We start the analysis by characterizing the class of contracts that induce the agent
to acquire and reveal the signal in every period. In principle, an incentive compatible
mechanism has to satisfy a large number of constraints since the agent may shirk and lie
in one or several periods. The next lemma simplies the analysis dramatically. Lemma
1 below identies a much smaller set of constraints which are necessary and su¢ cient to
guarantee incentive compatibility.
In order to state our next result, we need to introduce some additional notation. Fix
a contract w. Consider period t = 0; : : : ; T   1; and suppose that the agents belief (that
the state is ! = G) is equal to p 2 [0; 1] : With another minor abuse of notation, we let
u (t; p;w) denote the agents expected utility, computed in period t; when he acquires and
reveals the signal in every period t0 > t:
u (t; p;w) = pw (t) + p (1  )w (t+ 1) + : : :+ p (1  )T 1 t T 1 tw (T   1)+
p (1  )T t T 1 tw (G) + (1  p) T 1 tw (B) 
c
h
1 +  (p (1  ) + 1  p) + : : :+ T 1 t

p (1  )T 1 t + 1  p
i
:
Notice that u (0; p0;w) = u (w) : We also let u (T; p;w) ; p 2 [0; 1] ; be given by:
u (T; p;w) =
1

[pw (G) + (1  p)w (B)] : (3)
For notational simplicity, we drop the argument w in u (t; p;w) and u (; p0;w) when
there is no ambiguity.
5In the next section we consider the case in which the agents initial belief is private information. For
this reason it is convenient to make explicit the dependence of the agents utility on the prior p0:
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Lemma 1 A contract w is incentive compatible if and only if it satises the following
constraints:
u (0; p0;w) > p0w (0) ; (4)
u (t; pt;w) > u (t+ 1; pt;w) ; t = 0; : : : ; T   1; (5)
w (t) > w (t+ 1) ; t = 0; : : : ; T   2: (6)
We say that the agent guesses state G in a certain period t if in that period he shirks
and announces message G: Constraint (4) guarantees that the agent does not guess state
G in period 0. Constraint (5) considers one-period deviations.The agent cannot nd it
protable to shirk and announce message B in a single period (in all the remaining periods
the agent acquires and reveals the signal). Finally, because of constraint (6), the agent does
not want to delay the announcement of message G once he discovers that the true state
is indeed G: Not surprisingly, an incentive compatible mechanism must necessarily satisfy
constraints (4)-(6).
It is more interesting to see why constraints (4)-(6) provide su¢ cient conditions for
incentive compatibility. First, constraints (6) together with constraint (5) for t = T   1
guarantee that it is optimal for the agent to tell the truth as soon as he discovers that
the state is good. This, in turn, implies that it cannot be optimal to invest in information
acquisition and lie after observing signal B: Intuitively, such a strategy is dominated by a
strategy under which the agent sends message G without acquiring the signal.
Next, notice that under a guessing strategy the agent receives a positive payment
if and only if the state is good. The fact that the discounted sequence of payments
tw (t)
	T 1
t=0
is (weakly) decreasing implies that if it is not protable to guess state G
in period 0; then it cannot be protable to guess it in any other period t > 0:
We are therefore left with strategies under which the agent can do two things in every
period. He can either acquire the signal and reveal it truthfully, or he can shirk and send
message B: Constraint (5) is enough to prevent deviations under which the agent shirks in
one or several periods.
To give some intuition, let us consider the agent in period t: Among the remaining
discounted payments that the agent can receive in stateG; w (t) is the largest one. However,
the agent can get this payment only if he acquires the signal in period t (recall that we have
restricted attention to strategies under which the agent announces G only if he observes
signal G). Consider two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst scenario, the agent has acquired the
signal in every period t0 < t: Constraint (5), evaluated at t; implies that given the belief pt
the agent is willing to pay the cost c to have a chance to receive the payment w (t) : In the
second scenario, the agent has shirked at least once before t. In period t; his belief is larger
than pt: Therefore, the agent is more optimistic that he will receive the large payment w (t)
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than under the rst scenario. In other words, in the second scenario the agent has a strict
incentive to exert e¤ort. Thus, we conclude that if it is not protable for the agent to shirk
once, then, a fortiori, it will not be protable to shirk several times.
Given Lemma 1 we can restate the principals problem as
min
w>0
u (w)
s.t. (4)-(6).
We let w (p0) =

(w (t; p0))
T 1
t=0 ; w
 (G; p0) ; w (B; p0)

denote the optimal mechanism
when the prior is p0. Again, to simplify the notation we drop the argument p0 in w (p)
when there is no ambiguity.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal contract. In the proposition and in the
rest of the paper we adopt the following convention: if the lower bound of a summation is
strictly larger than the upper bound then the summation is equal to zero.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract is
w (t) = c
pt
+ c
T 1P
t0=t+1
t
0 t

1
pt0
  1

; t = 0; : : : ; T   1;
w (G) = 0;
w (B) = c
(1 p0)T 1 + c
T 2P
t0=0
 t
0
:
(7)
In the proof of Proposition 1, we solve a relaxed problem in which we ignore the
non-negativity constraints and constraint (6). We show that the remaining constraints
(4) and (5) must be binding and that it is optimal to set w (G) = 0: Therefore, the
solution to the relaxed problem is the solution to a linear system with T + 2 equa-
tions (the constraints (4) and (5) and the equation w (G) = 0) and T + 2 unknowns
(w (0) ; : : : ; w (T   1) ; w (G) ; w (B)). The unique solution to the system is the contract w
dened in equation (7) which satises the non-negativity constraints and, furthermore, has
the following feature:
w (t) = w (t+ 1) +
c (1  )
pt
for t = 0; : : : ; T 2:We conclude that the contract w satises constraint (6) and is optimal.
The optimal contract presents a number of interesting properties. The agent receives
a positive payment only when his reports match the state (notice that w (G) = 0). In-
tuitively, the cheapest way to motivate the agent to acquire information is to reward him
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in the states that support his announcements. The sequence of payments fw (t)gT 1t=0 that
the agent receives when he correctly announces the good state is (weakly) increasing over
time.6 As time passes without observing a good signal, the agent becomes more pessimistic
about the arrival of evidence in favor of the good state. Consequently, the principal has to
pay larger payments to motivate agent to invest in information acquisition. At the same
time, the sequence of discounted payments

tw (t)
	T 1
t=0
is (weakly) decreasing over time.
Hence, the optimal contract rewards earlier discoveries. This is required to prevent the
agent from delaying the announcement of evidence in favor of the good state. Finally, the
agent is tempted to make no investment in information acquisition and guess the good
state immediately. To preclude this deviation, the principal promises a large payment at
the end of the relationship if the state is bad (and the agent reports the bad signal in every
period).
So far we have restricted attention to contracts which are both evidence-based and ex-
treme. Do there exist optimal contracts without these properties? The answer depends
on which property of the contract we consider. First, optimal contracts must be evidence-
based. To see this, suppose that there exists an optimal contract which species an inter-
mediate payment x > 0 in period t < T 1:Without loss of generality, we may assume that
the agent receives no payment if he reports message G and the state is B (i.e., the contract
is extreme). Then we must be able to construct an optimal evidence-based mechanism w
by increasing all the nal payments in period t0 = t+1; : : : :T 1; by the amount (1=)t0 t x:
By construction, we have w (G) > 0: But recall that w (G) = 0: Thus, this contradicts the
fact that w is the unique optimal mechanism in the class of evidence-based and extreme
contracts.
Second, the optimal contract is not necessarily unique within the class of all contracts.
Indeed, it is easy to construct examples of optimal mechanisms which are not extreme. We
summarize our discussion in the following remark.
Remark 1 If a contract is optimal then it is evidence-based. The optimal contract is not
necessarily unique. Among the optimal contracts, one and only one is extreme.
2.2 The Agents Information Rent
Recall that the optimal contract w satises constraint (4) with equality. Thus, the
agents expected payo¤ under w can be easily computed:
u (w) = p0w (0) =
c

+ c (1  p0)
T 1X
t=1


1  
t
:
6More precisely, the sequence is strictly increasing is if  < 1 and constant if  = 1.
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This is the information rent that the principal has to pay to motivate the agent to work
and be honest. In our model, the agent has two sources of private information since both
his action and his signal are unobservable. Thus, the information rent can be divided into
two components: a moral hazard component and a hidden information component.
To see this, consider a variant of our model in which the signal is veriable. Recall that
the signal structure is such that either the agent nds denitive evidence in favor of state
G or he does not. It is therefore natural to assume that if the agent shirks then he and the
principal observe signal B with probability one. Only the agent who invests in information
acquisition can discover the evidence. The new model is one with moral hazard but no
hidden information. That is, the contract must induce the agent to exert e¤ort in every
period. However, incentive compatibility does not impose a truthtelling requirement since
the outcome (B or G) generated by the agents action and the state is publicly observed.
It is straightforward to show that in the new model the optimal contract is identical
to w except that the payment w (B) is equal to zero.7 In contrast, in our original model
w (B) > 0 and the agent receives it in period T   1 with probability 1   p0 (if the state
is B). Thus, the discounted expected utility of w (B) represents the hidden information
component of the agents information rent and is equal to
T 1 (1  p0)w (B) = c

+ c (1  p0)
T 1X
t=1
t:
The di¤erence between u (w) and the expression above
u (w)  T 1 (1  p0)w (B) = c (1  p0)
T 1X
t=1


1  
t
represents the moral hazard component of the information rent.8
The information rent u (w) is a U-shaped function of the signal quality ; and goes to
innity both when  is close to zero and when  is close to one. This reects the combined
e¤ect that the signal quality has on the two components.
7When the realization of the signal is veriable, a contract is incentive compatible if and only if it
satises constraint (5). Notice that w (B) does not appear in the constraints. Also, if w (G) decreases, it
becomes easier to satisfy all the constraints. To minimize the cost of the contract, it is therefore optimal
to set w (B) = 0; w (G) = 0 and to satisfy all the constraints with equality. The unique solution to the
system is the vector of payments (w (0) ; : : : ; w (T   1)) :
8In principle, one could consider a di¤erent way to decompose the rent. In particular, one could compare
the benchmark model with a model in which the agents e¤ort is observable but his signal is not. However,
in this case the optimal contract is such that the agent receives the payment c if and only if he exerts e¤ort.
Thus, the agents rent is equal to zero. It is then impossible to evaluate the impact that the two di¤erent
forms of informational asymmetry have on the rent in our original model.
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The moral hazard rent is increasing in : To give some intuition, suppose for a moment
that the agents e¤ort and his signal are veriable. Consider a certain period t and let pt
(dened in equation (1)) denote the common belief. In this case it is enough to pay c=pt
upon observing signal G to motivate the agent to work. The ratio pt=pt+1 is increasing in
. Thus, as  grows the ratio between the payment in t+1 and the payment in t increases.
Consider the payments c=pt and c=pt+1 but now assume that the e¤ort of the agent is
not observable. Clearly, when  is higher the agent is more tempted to shirk in t in order
to get the larger payment in t+ 1: Therefore, the principal must give a higher information
rent to the agent when the quality of the signal improves.
On the other hand, the hidden information rent is decreasing in : Under the optimal
contract w; the agent is rewarded only if his messages and the state coincide. When the
quality of the signal is high it is risky to guess state G in the rst period. The agent can
pay the cost c and nd out, with high probability, the correct state. Thus when  is large a
low value of w (B) is su¢ cient to prevent the agent from deviating to a guessing strategy.
The comparative statics with respect to the remaining parameters of the model coincide
for the two components of the information rent. The ratio pt=pt+1 is decreasing in p0: Thus,
if we start with the payments c=pt and c=pt+1 of the model with observable e¤ort, the
agents incentives to shirk in t (in order to get the reward in t+ 1) become stronger when
state G becomes less likely (p0 decreases). Therefore, the payments (w (t))
T 1
t=0 and the
moral hazard rent are decreasing in p0: This, in turn, makes it more protable for the agent
to guess state G when that state is less likely. As a consequence, the hidden information
rent is also decreasing in p0:
Finally, the information rent is increasing in c and : By shirking in a certain period t
the agent saves the cost c but, at the same time, he eliminates the possibility of getting
a reward in t: Clearly, shirking is more protable when the test is particularly costly or
when the agent becomes more patient. When c and  are high the principal must reward
the agents with larger payments (w (t))T 1t=0 and a larger moral hazard rent. In turn, the
larger the payments (w (t))T 1t=0 ; the stronger the incentives to use a guessing strategy. It
follows that c and  also have a positive impact on the hidden information rent.
3 The Optimal Length of the Contract
As anticipated in Section 2, we now investigate the case in which the length of the
contract is endogenous. Hence, the principal chooses the length T to maximize his expected
payo¤. To be able to compare all possible lengths, we rst need to describe the optimal
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contract when T = 1: One can easily verify that
w (0) = c
p
; w (G) = 0; w (B) = c
(1 p)
and the agents information rent is u (w) = c=:
For every T = 0; 1; : : : ; let V (T ) denote the principals discounted expected utility from
the decision when he can observe at most T signals. Also, let C (T ) denote the discounted
expected cost of inducing the agent to acquire T signals. We have C (0) = ~C (0) = 0 and
for every T > 1
C (T ) = ~C (T ) + c

+ c (1  p0)
T 1P
t=1
 

1 
t
;
~C (T ) = c+ c
T 1P
t=1
t

p0 (1  )t + 1  p0

;
(8)
where ~C (T ) denotes the expected cost of T signals when the principal has direct access to
them (or, equivalently, when the agents e¤ort is veriable).
The optimal length T  maximizes V (T )  C (T ). We let ~T denote the e¢ cient length,
i.e. the length that maximizes V (T )  ~C (T ) :While closed-form solutions of T  and ~T are
not readily available, it is simple to compare them.
Fact 1 The optimal length T  is (weakly) smaller than the e¢ cient length ~T :
The above result follows from the fact that the agents rent is increasing in the length
of the contract T: As one would expect, the presence of informational asymmetries yields a
suboptimal outcome. In particular, testing is stopped too early and the gains of additional
signals are not realized.
So far we have assumed that the duration of the relationship is deterministic. However,
one could imagine a more general class of mechanisms in which the principal randomizes
among contracts of di¤erent lengths. Are mechanisms with random duration optimal? The
answer is no. More precisely, there is always an optimal contract with deterministic length.
Furthermore, for generic values of the parameters of the model, the optimal length of the
contract is unique.
Fix a positive integerK and consider a random mechanism under which the relationship
lasts (at most) Tk periods with probability k; k = 1; : : : ; K: At the beginning of period 0;
the principal randomly chooses a length in the set fT1; : : : ; TKg according to the probability
distribution (1; : : : ; K) : The principal does not inform the agent about his choice. If the
selected length is Tk; the relationship ends as soon as the agent announces the good signal
or in period Tk 1 if the agent reports the bad signal in period t = 0; : : : ; Tk 1: As usual,
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the payments to the agent depend on his messages and on the state of the world. The cost
of the optimal mechanism with such a random length is equal to:9
1C (T1) + : : :+ KC (TK) ;
where C (Tk) is dened in equation (8) and represents the cost of the optimal contract with
length Tk: This immediately implies that the principal is willing to randomize among two
or more lengths if and only if he is completely indi¤erent among all of them.
4 Asymmetric Initial Information
In Section 2, we assume that the principal and the agent share the same information
about the state at the outset of the relationship. This is a restrictive assumption if the agent
is an expert who has been exposed to similar problems in the past. In such cases it seems
natural to assume that the principal and the agent enter their relationship with di¤erent
levels of information. For example, suppose that the state is identically and independently
distributed across problems according to an unknown probability distribution. Consider
the relationship between an agent who has already consulted for many di¤erent principals
and a new principal. Since the agent has observed the realization of the state in su¢ ciently
many problems, it is reasonable to assume that he knows the true distribution. On the other
hand, the principal does not have access to past information and is, therefore, uninformed.
The goal of this section is to analyze how the principal motivates an informed agent
to carry out his task. In particular, we investigate how the additional source of private
information a¤ects the optimal mechanism and the agents information rent.
To allow the expert to possess initial information, we modify the model presented in
Section 2 and let the agent have a private type at the beginning of period 0: For tractability,
we assume that there are two possible types, low or high. The agents type is correlated
with the state which is equal to G with probability p0 and B with probability 1   p0: We
nd it convenient to denote the two types by their beliefs, p`0 and p
h
0 ; that the state is G:
Thus, if we let Pr
 
pk0j!

denote the probability of type pk0; k = h; `; in state ! = B;G; we
9For brevity, we only provide a sketch of the proof and omit the details. We consider a relaxed problem
in which only two types of deviations are admitted. The agent can either guess state G in period 0 or he
can shirk and announce message B in one and only one period. These deviations correspond to constraints
(4) and (5) in Lemma 1. The solution to the relaxed problem satises all the constraints with equality and
the payments are positive only if the agents messages match the state. The cost of the optimal contract
of the relaxed problem is equal to 1C (T1) + : : :+ KC (TK) : Finally, it is easy to check that the optimal
contract of the relaxed problem is incentive compatible.
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have:
pk0 =
p0 Pr
 
pk0jG

p0 Pr
 
pk0jG

+ (1  p0) Pr
 
pk0jB
 :
We assume 1 > Pr
 
ph0 jG

> Pr
 
ph0 jB

> 0 and, thus, 1 > ph0 > p
`
0 > 0. We also let
 = p0 Pr
 
ph0 jG

+ (1  p0) Pr
 
ph0 jB

denote the (unconditional) probability of the high type ph0 : Thus, the principal believes that
the agents type is high with probability  and low with probability 1   .
We assume that the number of available signals is T > 2:10 For k = h; ` and t = 0; : : : ; T;
we let
pkt =
pk0 (1  )t
pk0 (1  )t + 1  pk0
denote the agents belief that the state is G if his type is pk0 and he observes t signals equal
to B:
As in Section 2, the principal tries to induce the agent to acquire and reveal the sig-
nal in every period t = 0; : : : ; T   1 (until he observes signal G).11 Since the agent
has private information about his type, a mechanism
 
wh; w`

consists of a pair of con-
tracts, one for each type. In this section, we focus on evidence-based and extreme mech-
anisms (for simplicity, we refer to them simply as mechanisms) and, therefore, wk = 
wk (t)
T 1
t=0
; wk (G) ; wk (B)

; for k = h; `: This is without loss of generality in the sense
that there is an optimal mechanism in the class of evidence-based and extreme mechanisms
(we briey return to this point at the end of the section).
Thus, the game between the principal and the agent is as follows. In period 0; the
principal o¤ers a pair of contracts
 
wh; w`

and the agent chooses one. In every period
t = 0; : : : ; T   1; the agent decides whether to exert e¤ort or not and sends a message from
the set fB;Gg : The game ends as soon the agent announces message G (or in period T  1
if he reports message B in every period). The agent receives the payment specied by the
contract that he chose.
10We rule out the simplest case T = 1 because the notation developed for the general case T > 2 should
be slightly modied when T = 1: However, it is straightforward to extend all the results developed in this
section to the special case T = 1:
11To gain some intuition on how the agents initial information a¤ects the shape of the mechanism,
we develop a simple model in which the length of the contract is the same for both types of the agent.
This is a reasonable assumption if there is an exogenous deadline T by which the principal has to make
a decision and the additional value of each signal is large compared to the cost of e¤ort c: Of course, it
is easy to imagine situations in which the principal prefers to induce the two types to acquire di¤erent
numbers of signals. While some of our results in this section (Lemmata 2 and 3, the second part of Lemma
4, and Proposition 2) easily extend to the case of contracts with di¤erent lengths, we do not have a general
characterization of the optimal mechanism.
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If a mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible, then it is optimal for the type pk0;
k = h; `; to choose the contract wk and to acquire and reveal the signal in every period.
The principals problem is to nd the cheapest incentive compatible mechanism.
We say that a contract w =

(w (t))T 1t=0 ; w (G) ; w (B)

is suitable for type pk0 if it sat-
ises constraints (4)-(6) when the prior is pk0: Clearly, if
 
wh; w`

is an incentive compatible
mechanism, then for k = h; `; the contract wk must be suitable for type pk0:
An incentive compatible mechanism must also satisfy a set of constraints which prevent
the agent from lying about his initial type. In principle, we have one constraint for each
strategy  2  since a type who lies can then choose any contingent plan of actions and
messages. However, we now show that it is without loss of generality to ignore many of
these constraints.
Consider a pair of contracts
 
wh; w`

with wk suitable for type pk0; k = h; `: Consider
an arbitrary type pk0 and suppose that he chooses the contract w
k0 ; k0 6= k; designed for
the other type. Since wk
0
is suitable for pk
0
0 it is easy to see that it is optimal for type p
k
0
to reveal the signal truthfully. Furthermore, any strategy in which type pk0 guesses state
G in some period t yields a payo¤ weakly smaller than pk0w
k0 (0) (for both claims, see the
discussion following Lemma 1 and its proof).
Let us now restrict attention to the strategies under which the agent reveals the signal
truthfully and reports message B when he shirks. We denote this set of strategies by 0:
Formally, a strategy  belongs to 0 if for every t = 0; : : : ; T   1; every ht 2 H t; and every
s = B;G;
Mt (h
t; s) = s;
Mt (h
t; ne) = B:
Suppose that the high type ph0 faces the contract w
` and that this contract is suitable
for p`0: It is easy to see that the optimal strategy in 
0 for ph0 is to acquire the signal in
every period. Consider period t and suppose that the agent acquires and reveals the signal
in every period t0 > t: The fact that w` is suitable for p`0 implies that in period t the agent
strictly prefers to work and be honest if his belief is strictly larger than p`t: Clearly, under
any strategy in 0; the high types belief in period t must be strictly larger than p`t: Thus,
any strategy in 0 under which the agent shirks in at least one period (on-path) is strictly
dominated by the strategy under which the agent exerts e¤ort in every period.
Suppose now that the low type p`0 faces the contract w
h: Knowing that wh is suitable for
ph0 is not enough to pin down the low types optimal strategy in 
0: The easiest way to see
this is to consider a contract wh that satises constraint (5) for T  1 with strict inequality:
Suppose that the low types belief in period T   1 is smaller than phT 1: Given this limited
amount of information, it is clearly impossible to determined whether the agent prefers to
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acquire and reveal the signal or to shirk and announce message B:
We summarize the discussion above about incentive compatibility in the following
lemma. Recall that given a contract w; u (t; p;w) denotes the agents expected utility,
computed in period t; when his belief is p and he acquires and reveals the signal in every
period t0 > t: Also, u (; p;w) denotes the agents expected utility in period 0 if he follows
the strategy :
Lemma 2 A mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible if and only if wk is suitable for
pk0; k = h; `; and it satises the following inequalities:
u
 
0; pk0;w
k

> pk0wk
0
(0) ; k = h; `; k0 6= k;
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

;
u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> u
 
; p`0;w
h

;  2 0:
The next step of our analysis is to characterize the optimal mechanisms.
4.1 The Optimal Mechanism with Asymmetric Initial Informa-
tion
The principals problem is given by
min
wh>0;w`>0
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

+ (1  )u  0; p`0;w`
s.t.
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible.
(9)
The set of incentive compatible mechanisms is non-empty. To see this, notice that
the principal can always o¤er the following contract w to both types. The contract w
is identical to w
 
p`0

; the optimal contract o¤ered to the agent when he has no private
information and the prior is p`0, except that w (B) is such that the high type is indi¤erent
between acquiring and revealing the signal in every period and guessing state G in period 0
(thus, w (B) > w
 
B; p`0

). Clearly, the contract w is suitable both for ph0 and p
`
0. In fact,
as we will see below, when the two beliefs ph0 and p
`
0 are su¢ ciently close to each other, it
is indeed optimal to o¤er only the contract w. However, when the di¤erence between the
beliefs is su¢ ciently large, the principal prefers to o¤er two di¤erent contracts.
In general, there are multiple solutions to the principals problem. However, there are
some features of the contracts that are common to all optimal mechanisms. In particular,
the payments to the low type in state G coincide with the payments of the contract w
 
p`0

:
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Proposition 2 If
 
wh; w`

is an optimal mechanism then
w` (t) = w
 
t; p`0

for every t = 0; : : : ; T   1; and
w` (G) = w
 
G; p`0

:
Intuitively, to screen the types of the agent, it is convenient to provide each of them with
larger (smaller) payments in the state that he considers relatively more (less) likely. Hence,
the principal should provide low payments to the low type when he correctly announces the
good state. Among all the contracts that are suitable for p`0; w
  p`0 species the lowest
payments in state G. We conclude that there is no distortion on these payments in the
contract of the low type.
Consider an incentive compatible mechanism
 
wh; w`

and suppose that w` and w
 
p`0

do not have the same payments in state G: Suppose now that the principal lowers the
payments
 
w` (t)
T 1
t=0
and w` (G) to make them equal to the payments of w
 
p`0

: At the
same time the principal increases the payment w` (B) so that the low type is indi¤erent
between the old contract w` and the new contract, which we call w^`; when he acquires and
reveals the signal in every period.
Let us now evaluate how the change from w` to w^` a¤ects the utility of the high type
when he lies about his type and acquires and reveals the signal in every period. Compared
to the low type, the high type assigns higher probabilities to the payments in state G
(which are lower in w^` than in w`) and lower probability to the payment in state B (which
is higher in w^` than in w`). Clearly, if the low type is indi¤erent between the two contracts,
the high type must strictly prefer w` to w^`: Thus, under the mechanism
 
wh; w^`

; the high
type has a strict incentive to choose the contract wh: But then the principal can lower some
of the payments of wh without making it protable for the high type to imitate the low
type. Therefore, the original mechanism
 
wh; w`

is not optimal.
Proposition 2 shows that the payments to the low type in state G are not distorted from
the optimal mechanism w
 
p`0

: However, the fact that the agents initial belief is private
information does have an impact on the contract of the low type.
Lemma 3 If
 
wh; w`

is an incentive compatible mechanism then
u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> p`0w
` (0) :
Suppose that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible. The high type weakly
prefers to acquire and reveal the signal with the contract wh rather than guess state G
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in the rst period with the contract w`: But then the low type strictly prefers the rst
alternative to the second one. This is because the guessing strategy is more tempting for
the high type who is more optimistic about the good state. We conclude that choosing the
contract w` and guessing state G in the rst period is not the most protable deviation for
the low type. Thus, the incentive u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> p`0w` (0) does not bind.
Taken together, Proposition 2 and Lemma 3 imply that the information rent of the low
type under an optimal mechanism
 
wh; w`

satises
u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> p`0w
` (0) = p`0w
  0; p`0 = u  0; p`0;w  p`0 :
Compared to the benchmark case (i.e., no initial private information) with prior p`0, the
low type obtains a higher information rent. The additional rent comes in the form of a
payment w` (B) which is strictly larger than w
 
B; p`0

.
So far we have considered the low type. We now look for general properties of the
optimal contract of the high type. The next lemma shows that in the rst period the high
type must receive the same payment as the low type. Furthermore, the high type must be
indi¤erent between exerting e¤ort in every period and guessing state G immediately.
Lemma 4 If
 
wh; w`

is an optimal mechanism then
wh (0) = w` (0) = w
 
0; p`0

;
and
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= ph0w
h (0) :
First, we provide some intuition for the second result. Suppose that u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

>
ph0w
h (0) : Also, consider the case u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> p`0w
h (0) ; i.e. the constraint in which the
low type chooses wh and guesses state G immediately is not binding.12 Then the principal
can increase the value of wh (0) and decrease the value of wh (B) so that the high type
is indi¤erent between the old contract wh and the new contract, which we call w^h; when
he acquires and reveals the signal in every period. However, given any strategy in 0, the
low type is strictly worse o¤ with the contract w^h than with the contract wh: The logic is
similar to that of Proposition 2. The principal makes the deviations of a certain type more
costly by decreasing (increasing) the payments that the type deems relatively more (less)
likely. Finally, the principal can also lower the payment w` (B) by a small amount and the
12In the proof we show that if u
 
0; p`0;w
`

= p`0w
h (0) ; then the principal can lower the payment wh (B)
by a small amount and all the incentive constraints are still satised.
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new mechanism is incentive compatible. This shows that the original mechanism
 
wh; w`

is not optimal.
Since u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= ph0w
h (0) ; wh (0) must be weakly greater than w` (0) otherwise the
high type would have an incentive to choose the contract w` and guess state G immedi-
ately. In the proof we rule out the case wh (0) > w` (0) by showing that the principal can
lower wh (0) and some other payments of the contract wh without violating the incentive
constraints.
Lemma 4 has a number of important implications. First, notice that the information
rent of the high type is ph0w
  0; p`0 and that this is larger than ph0w  0; ph0 ; the rent that
he would obtain in the benchmark model with prior ph0 . Thus, both types benet from the
fact that their initial belief is private information. This is in contrast to many models of
adverse selection in which the principal is able to extract all the rents from a certain type.
Second, the contract o¤ered to the low type is the same among all optimal mechanisms.
Suppose that
 
wh; w`

and
 
w^h; w^`

are two optimal mechanisms. Then u
 
0; p`0;w
`

and
u
 
0; p`0; w^
`

must coincide, since u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

and u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h

coincide. However, the con-
tracts w` and w^` have the same payments in state G: The low type can be indi¤erent among
w` and w^` (when he works in every period) if and only if w` (B) = w^` (B) : Therefore, w`
must be equal to w^`:
Third, the solution to the principals problem does not depend on the probability dis-
tribution of the two types (i.e., the parameter ). Clearly, the set of incentive compatible
mechanisms does not vary with : Lemma 4 guarantees that for every  the high type
receives the same utility ph0w
  0; p`0 under an optimal mechanism. Thus, the utility of the
low type must also be the same for all values of :
Proposition 2, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 identify a part of the contracts that is common
to all the optimal mechanisms. The remaining part may vary among optimal mechanisms.
Moreover, it is also a¤ected by the distance between the two beliefs ph0 and p
`
0:
Recall that w denotes the contract that is identical to w
 
p`0

; except for the value of
w (B) ; which is such that
u
 
0; ph0 ; w

= ph0 w (0) = p
h
0w
  0; p`0 :
As mentioned above, the mechanism ( w; w) under which the principal o¤ers the same
contract w to both types is incentive compatible. The next proposition identies necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the optimality of such a mechanism.
Proposition 3 The mechanism ( w; w) is optimal if and only if p`0 2

ph1 ; p
h
0

: Furthermore,
if p`0 2
 
ph1 ; p
h
0

; then ( w; w) is the unique optimal mechanism.
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Recall from Lemma 4 that a mechanism
 
wh; w`

can be optimal only if wh gives to the
high type the same rent as the contract w. Furthermore, we must have wh (0) = w (0). We
also know from Proposition 2 that the contract w` is such that the low type is indi¤erent
between exerting e¤ort in every period and exerting e¤ort only after the rst one.
Let us now investigate how the principal could improve upon the mechanism ( w; w) :
To do that the principal must o¤er to the high type a contract wh which is less attractive
than w for the low type both when he expends e¤ort in every period and when he does so
only in period t = 1; : : : ; T   1: Otherwise, the low type would have an incentive to accept
the contract of the high type and adopt one of the two strategies described above.
First, let us consider the strategy under which the low type acquires and reveals the
signal in every period. At the beginning of period 0; he is less optimistic than the high
type (about the good state). Therefore, wh is less attractive than w if it promises less when
the agent correctly anticipates the bad state (i.e., wh (B) < w (B)). Of course, this implies
that wh is more generous than w when the agent announces the good state in period t > 1:
Consider now the strategy under which the low type shirks in period 0 and exerts e¤ort
in any other period. Let us compare now the two types at the beginning of t = 1; after the
high type has observed a bad signal (and the low type has shirked). If p`0 < p
h
1 ; the low
type is still less optimistic than the high type. In this case too, the low type prefers w to
the new contract wh if wh (B) < w (B) : In other words, when p`0 < p
h
1 ; the changes to the
contract of the high type that prevent the two deviations of the low type go in the same
direction. Suppose now that p`0 > p
h
1 : In this case, at the beginning of t = 1 the low agent
is more optimistic than the high type. To make the new contract wh less attractive than
w for the low type, the principal must increase the payment wh (B) : But this change is
just the opposite of what is needed to prevent the rst deviation. When the initial beliefs
of the two types are su¢ ciently close, there is no room to change the contract of the high
type and prevent the two deviations of the low type. This is because the two deviations
lead to opposite results in terms of the comparison between the typesbeliefs.
Finally, the case p`0 = p
h
1 is special in the sense that the change that prevents the
rst deviation (i.e., wh (B) < w (B)) leaves the low type indi¤erent in terms of the second
deviation. While it is not possible to improve upon ( w; w) ; this mechanism is not necessarily
the unique optimal one.
We now turn to the case p`0 6 ph1 : In this case, there are multiple optimal mechanisms.
We describe one in the next proposition and then address the issue of multiplicity.
Proposition 4 Suppose that p`0 6 ph1 : There exists an optimal mechanism
 
wh; w`

which
satises
wh (B) 2 w  B; ph0 ; w` (B)
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and one of the following two conditions:
(i) there exists t^ 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g such that
wh (t) =
w(0;p`0)
t
; t < t^
wh
 
t^
 2 w  t^; p`0 ; wh(t^ 1) 
wh (t) = w
 
t; p`0

; t > t^
wh (G) = 0
(ii)
wh (t) =
w(0;p`0)
t
; t = 0; : : : ; T   1
wh (G) 2

0; wh (T   1)  c
phT 1
i
:
In the proof we start with an arbitrary optimal mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

: We let  > 0
denote
 = u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h
  u  1; ph0 ; w^h :
This and the fact that w^h must satisfy the conditions in Lemma 4 immediately give us
the value of w^h (B) ; which is increasing in  and coincides with w
 
B; ph0

when  = 0
(see equation (29)).
Then we construct the mechanism
 
wh; w`

described in Proposition 4. Of course,
w` = w^` and wh (0) = w^h (0) : We also let wh (B) = w^h (B) : The remaining payments of
wh are determined using the following algorithm. In the rst step, we let wh have the same
payments as w` after period one and choose wh (1) to satisfy
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h
  u  1; ph0 ;wh = : (10)
If the solution wh (1) is between w` (1) and w
`(0)

we stop. Otherwise we let wh (1) = w
`(0)

and move to the second step. In step t; t = 2; : : : ; T , we let the payment wh (t0) ; t0 < t;
be equal to w
`(0)
t
0 : We also let wh have the same payments as w` after period t and choose
the remaining payment wh (t) (this is wh (G) if we are in step T ) to solve equation (10).
Finally, we show that the resulting mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible and has
the same expected cost as the original mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

:
Of course, the value of wh
 
t^

(or the value of wh (G) if
 
wh; w`

satises condition (ii))
depends on  which is endogenous. For the special case in which p`0 =
ph0 (1 )t
ph0 (1 )t+1 ph0
for
some t = 1; 2; : : : ; it is possible to show that there exists an optimal mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

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such that u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h

= u
 
1; ph0 ; w^
h

: In other words, we can assume that  is equal
to zero. However, this is not true in general. There are examples in which  is strictly
positive for any optimal mechanism.
The mechanism described in Proposition 4 has very intuitive properties. After some
period t^; the two contracts wh and w` specify the same payments in state G: However,
before t^ the principal sets the payment of wh at their highest possible levels.13 This is
useful to separate the two types and prevent the low type from choosing the contract wh:
In fact, in the initial periods the low type is much less optimistic that he will receive a
payment in state G: Even if these initial payments are large, he will not nd it protable to
choose wh and exert e¤ort. As time goes on and the high type observes more signals equal
to B, his posterior gets closer to the initial belief of the low type. If the later payments
of wh are large (and su¢ cient to motivate the high type) then the low type could nd it
protable to choose wh and start to acquire the signal after a few periods.
Suppose that the low type chooses the contract wh: Since the payments of wh after t^
are the same as the payments of w
 
p`0

(the optimal contract in the benchmark model
with prior p`0) and w
h
 
t^

> w
 
t^; p`0

; the low type does not have an incentive to shirk in
t^; : : : ; T   1 (under any strategy the belief of the low type in period t must be at least p`t).
Before t^ the low type may prefer to shirk. However, the decision to shirk should not be
delayed. If t < t^  1; then the agent is indi¤erent between the payment wh (t) in t and the
payment wh (t+ 1) in t+ 1: By denition, they have the same discounted value. However,
the agent prefers to pay the cost c in t+1 rather than in t (this preference is strict if  < 1).
To sum up, given wh it is optimal for the low type to adopt the following strategy. He
shirks in the rst t periods (for some t < t^) and then acquires and reveals the signal in
t + 1; : : : ; T   1: Given this, it is easy to see why the solution to the principals problem
is not unique. Consider the optimal mechanism described in Proposition 4. For example,
suppose that given wh all the strategies under which the low type works in period 1 and/or
period 2 are strictly dominated. Suppose now that the principal increases wh (1) by a
small amount and decreases wh (2) to keep constant the rent of the high type. As far as
the low type is concerned, this change a¤ects only strategies that are strictly dominated.
Since the original contract wh satises all the constraints in (5) with strict inequality, the
new contract of the high type is still suitable for ph0 : We have therefore constructed a new
optimal mechanism.
So far we have restricted attention to evidence-based and extreme mechanisms. Allowing
for intermediate payments has no consequences for the contract of the low type. Recall
13Recall that wh (t) must be weakly smaller than w
h(0)
t
otherwise the high type could delay the an-
nouncement of the signal G. Also, notice that if the optimal mechanism
 
wh; w`

satises condition (ii) in
Proposition 4, then all the payments wh (1) ; : : : ; wh (T   1) are set at their highest possible levels.
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that in any optimal mechanism
 
wh ; w`

the payment w` (G) is equal to zero. The contract
of the low type must be evidence-based.
Moreover, when p`0 > p
h
1 ; ( w; w) remains the unique optimal mechanism in the class of
extreme mechanisms. However, when p`0 6 ph1 there are optimal evidence-based mechanisms 
wh; w`

under which all the payments of wh are strictly positive. In this case it is possible
to modify the contract wh to allow for intermediate payments. In other words, there are
optimal mechanisms under which the contract of the high type is not evidence-based.
Finally, it is easy to construct examples of optimal mechanisms which are not extreme.
This is true both when p`0 > p
h
1 and when p
`
0 6 ph1 :
The results in this section show that the introduction of asymmetric information at
the time of contracting leads to a number of novel predictions. First, all types benet
from their initial private information. Compared to the optimal contract of the benchmark
model, each type receives a larger payment when the state is bad. In addition, the high
type receives larger payments when he correctly announces the good state. These payments
are also front-loaded if the initial beliefs of the two types are su¢ ciently diverse.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic information ac-
quisition process. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant
to the principals decision. The agents e¤ort and the realizations of his signals are unob-
servable. The principal commits to a long-term contract that species the payments to the
agent. The optimal contract induces the agent to perform the test and reveal its outcome
truthfully in every period and minimizes his expected utility.
First, we assume that the agent has no private information at the outset of the rela-
tionship. Under the optimal contract, the agent is rewarded only when his reports are
supported by the state. The payments that the agent receives when he announces the good
state increase over time. We show that agency problems shorten the information acqui-
sition process. We then extend the analysis to the case in which the agent has superior
information at the time of contracting. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and show
that the contract o¤ered to the low type is minimally distorted. The principal prefers to
o¤er di¤erent contracts if and only if the typesbeliefs are su¢ ciently diverse. Finally, all
the types benet from their initial private information.
In our model, the state of the world is observed no matter what decision the principal
makes. However, one can imagine situations in which the state is revealed only if the
principal chooses certain actions. For instance, consider an oil company hiring a team
of geologists to perform preliminary investigations and give a recommendation about the
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protability of a new site. If the company decides not to invest in the site, its protability
remains unknown. Consider a variant of the model in which the principal does not learn
the state if the agent reports the bad signal in every period. If the agent has no private
information at the time of contracting, the analysis is similar to the one in Sections 2
and 3.14 A mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it satises constraints (4)-(6),
and constraints (4) and (5) are binding under the optimal contract. Compared to our
benchmark model, the agent is able to extract larger information rents since the principal
has less instruments to monitor his e¤ort. As in our model, the information acquisition
problem is shorter than the e¢ cient one because of agency problems.
Under our information structure, the agents beliefs evolve in a simple way. Either the
agent becomes certain that the state is good or his belief that the state is bad increases.
Although this information structure is commonly used in models of dynamic agency (see,
among others, Bergemann and Hege 1998, 2005 and Hörner and Samuelson 2010), it is
natural to consider more general information structures under which all the realizations of
the signal contain some noise. Our results are robust to small perturbations. Consider a
variant of the benchmark model in which the probability of observing the good signal when
the state is bad is  > 0: Consider the optimal contract that induces the agent to acquire
and reveal the signal in every period t = 0; : : : ; T   1 until he observes a good signal.
If  is su¢ ciently small, the optimal contract is determined by the same set of binding
constraints as in Section 2. As  converges to zero, the optimal contract approaches the
contract described in Proposition 1.
Preliminary investigation also suggests that a number of properties of our optimal mech-
anism extend to the case in which the signals do not provide extreme evidence in favor of
the states. First, moral-hazard, hidden-information and adverse-selection rents are present
in general environments. Second, it is possible to show that information rents are non-
monotonic in the precision of the signal. Finally, the rents are increasing in the length
of the information acquisition process which is, therefore, shorter than the e¢ cient one.
Obtaining a closed-form solution for the optimal contract in general settings seems di¢ cult
since the binding constraints may vary with the parameters of the model. We leave this
challenging task for future research.
14Extending the analysis when the agent is privately informed is less immediate and beyond the scope
of the paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
We have only to prove that if a mechanism w satises constraints (4)-(6) then it is
incentive compatible. Notice that if  and 0 are two strategies which induce the same
on-path behavior, then u (; p0;w) = u (0; p0;w) :
Let  2 n be a strategy such that Mt (ht; s) 6= s for some on-path history (ht; s) (i.e.,
on path the agent acquires the signal and lies about its realization). We claim that there
exists another strategy 0 which yields a weakly larger payo¤: u (0; p0;w) > u (; p0;w) :
First, suppose Mt (h
t; G) = B: The agents continuation payo¤ after observing signal G is
bounded above by
max

w (t+ 1) ; : : : ; T 1 tw (T   1) ; T 1 tw (G)	 :
If instead the agent reports message G, his continuation payo¤ is equal to w (t) : From
constraint (5) at T   1;
0 6 u (T   1; pT 1)  u (T; pT 1) =
 c+ pT 1 [w (T   1)  w (G)] ; (11)
we obtain
w (T   1) > w (G) : (12)
Let 0 be identical to  except that we set 0Mt (h
t; G) = G: Inequality (12) and constraint
(6) immediately imply u (0; p0;w) > u (; p0;w) :
Consider now the case in which (ht; B) and (ht; G) are two on-path histories and
Mt (h
t; B) = Mt (h
t; G) = G: Clearly, the agent strictly prefers to save the cost c and send
the uninformed message G: Thus, let 0 be identical to ; except that we set 
0A
t (h
t) = ne
and 
0M
t (h
t; ne) = G: Then we have u (0; p0;w) > u (; p0;w) :
Given these initial observations, in what follows, we restrict attention to strategies 
under which the agent reveals truthfully all the signals that he acquires: Mt (h
t; s) = s
for all on-path histories (ht; s) : Let 0 be a strategy that prescribes guessing state G (i.e.,
shirking and announcing message G) in the rst period. Let ^ be any strategy such that
the agent guesses state G in some period t^ > 0 (and this is part of the on-path behavior).
We now show that the agent weakly prefers 0 to ^: Let  1 < : : : <  k^ < t^; for some k^ 6 t^;
denote the k^ periods in which the agent acquires the signal under the strategy prole ^.15
15Recall that we have already ruled out strategies under which the agent lies after observing the signal
G: Thus, the agent acquires the signal in period k; k = 2; : : : ; k^ , only if he has never observed the signal
G before.
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We have
u (0; p0) = p0w (0) >
p0
1w ( 1) + p0 (1  )2w ( 2) + : : :+ p0 (1  )k^ 1  k^w ( k^) + p0 (1  )k^ t^w
 
t^
 
c
h
1 + 2 (p0 (1  ) + 1  p0) + : : :+  k^

p0 (1  )k^ 1 + 1  p0
i
= u (^; p0) ;
where the inequality follows from c > 0 and constraint (6) (this constraint implies w (0) >
tw (t) for every t). Combining this result with constraint (4) we obtain u (0; p0) > u (^; p0) :
It remains to consider strategies  under which the agents on-path behavior is to tell
the truth when he acquires the signal and to send message B when he shirks: Mt (h
t; s) = s
and Mt (h
t; ne) = B; for all on-path histories (ht; s), (ht; ne). The last step of the proof is
to show that constraint (5) implies
u (t; p) > u (t+ 1; p) (13)
for every t = 0; : : : ; T   1 and every p > pt: This will be enough to conclude that the
mechanism w is incentive compatible because it implies that any strategy in which the
agent shirks more than once is strictly dominated. To see this, consider a strategy ~ under
which the agent shirks in two or more periods. Let ~t denote the last period in which the
agent shirks. Let ~p denote the agents belief in period ~t: Because the agent has shirked at
least once before ~t; we have ~p > pt: Clearly, u
 
~t; ~p

> u
 
~t+ 1; ~p

implies that the agent
has a strict incentive to exert e¤ort in period ~t (given that he will exert e¤ort in all future
periods). On the other hand, any strategy in which the agent shirks only once is weakly
dominated by the strategies in  because of constraints (5). Thus, the mechanism w is
incentive compatible.
We now prove inequality (13). One can immediately see from inequality (11) that
inequality (13) holds for t = T   1:
Given the contract w; dene a (T   1;w) and b (T   1;w) as follows:
a (T   1;w) = w (B)  c;
b (T   1;w) = w (T   1) + (1  )w (G)  w (B) ;
and for every t = 0; : : : ; T   2 dene recursively
a (t;w) =  c+ a (t+ 1;w) ;
b (t;w) = w (t)  a (t+ 1;w) +  (1  ) b (t+ 1;w) : (14)
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Notice that for every t and every p
u (t; p) =  c+ pw (t) + (1  p) u

t+ 1;
p (1  )
1  p

:
Using an induction argument it is easy to check that for every t = 0; : : : ; T   1; and
every p 2 [0; 1]
u (t; p) = a (t) + b (t) p; (15)
where we have dropped the argument w in a (t;w) and b (t;w) to simplify the notation.
Thus, we have
u (t; p)  u (t+ 1; p) = a (t)  a (t+ 1) + [b (t)  b (t+ 1)] p:
Constraint (5) implies that the above expression is non-negative when p = pt: To con-
clude the proof of the lemma it is, therefore, su¢ cient to show that for t = 0; : : : ; T   2
b (t)  b (t+ 1) > 0;
which is equivalent to
w (t)  a (t+ 1)  b (t+ 1) > 0: (16)
The above inequality is satised for t = T   2: In fact
w (T   2)  a (T   1)  b (T   1) =
w (T   2)  w (T   1)   (1  )w (G) + c =
[w (T   2)  w (T   1)] +  (1  ) [w (T   1)  w (G)] + c > 0;
where the inequality follows from constraint (6), inequality (12), and, of course, c > 0:
We now proceed by induction. We assume that inequality (16) holds for t0 > t and
show that it also holds at t: We have
w (t)  a (t+ 1)  b (t+ 1) =
w (t)  w (t+ 1)  2 (1  ) [a (t+ 2) + b (t+ 2)] + c =
[w (t)  w (t+ 1)] +  (1  ) [w (t+ 1)  a (t+ 2)  b (t+ 2)] + c > 0;
where, again, the inequality follows from constraint (6), the induction hypothesis, and
c > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
We start by solving a relaxed problem in which we minimize u (w) subject to the con-
straints (4) and (5). That is, we ignore the non-negativity constraints and constraint (6).
Then we verify that the solution to the relaxed problem satises them.
Given a contract w; we dene ~' (w) ; ' (0; w) ; : : : ; ' (T   1; w) as follows:
~' (w) = u (0; p0;w)  p0w (0) =
p0

  (1  )w (0) + 
T 1P
t=1
(1  )t tw (t) + (1  )T T 1w (G)

+ (1  p0) T 1w (B)  ~ ;
and for every t = 0; : : : ; T   1
' (t; w) = u (t; pt;w)  u (t+ 1; pt;w) =
pt

w (t)  2
T 1P
t0=t+1
(1  )t0 t 1 t0 tw (t0)   (1  )T 1 t T 1 tw (G)

   t;
where ~ ;  0; : : : ;  T 1 are T + 1 constants. ~ is the agents (discounted) expected cost of
testing when he acquires and reveals the signal in every period. For every t;  t represents the
di¤erence between the expected costs of two di¤erent strategies. Under the rst strategy,
the agent starts to acquire the signal in period t: Under the second strategy he shirks in
period t and starts to acquire the signal in period t+ 1: For example,  T 1 is equal to c:
We now show that if w^ is a solution to the relaxed problem, then8>>>>><>>>>>:
~' (w^) = 0
' (t; w^) = 0; t = 0; : : : ; T   1
w^ (G) = 0:
(17)
Notice that w (B) appears only in ~' (w) with a positive coe¢ cient. If ~' (w^) > 0 then we
can lower w^ (B) by a small amount and all the constraints are still satised. Similarly, w (0)
appears only in ~' (w), with a negative coe¢ cient, and in ' (0; w) ; with a positive coe¢ cient.
Again, if ' (0; w^) > 0 we can lower w^ (0) by a small amount and all the constraints are still
satised. Thus, ~' (w^) = ' (0; w^) = 0 if w^ is a solution to the relaxed problem.
Suppose that w^ solves the relaxed problem and ' (t; w^) > 0 for some t = 1; : : : ; T   1:
Let t^ denote the smallest integer for which the inequality holds. Then consider a new
contract w0 which is identical to w^ except that we set
w0
 
t^

= w^
 
t^
  ";
w0 (0) = w^ (0)   (1  )t^ 1 t^"
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for some small positive ": Notice that '
 
t^; w0

> 0 for " su¢ ciently small. By construction,
~' (w0) = ' (0; w0) = 0: For t = 1; : : : ; t^   1; ' (t; w0) > ' (t; w^) since ' (t; w) is decreasing
in w
 
t^

: Also, ' (t; w0) = ' (t; w^) for t > t^: Thus, the contract w0; which is cheaper than
w^; satises all the constraints of the relaxed problem.
Finally, suppose by contradiction that w^ solves the relaxed problem and w^ (G) > 0:
Consider a new contract w0 that is identical to w^ except that we set
w0 (G) = 0;
w0 (0) = w^ (0)  (1  )T 1 T 1w^ (G) :
We have ~' (w0) = ' (0; w0) = 0 and ' (t; w0) > ' (t; w^) for every t > 0: This contradicts
the fact that w^ is a solution to the relaxed problem.
Consider now the system of linear equations (17). It is easy to check that the (unique)
solution w is given by equation (7) in Proposition 1.
Clearly, all the payments in w are non-negative. Also, notice that w satises all the
constraints in (5) with equality. Consider t = 0; : : : ; T   2: We have
0 = u (t; pt;w
)  u (t+ 1; pt;w) =
 c+ ptw (t) + (1  pt) u (t+ 1; pt+1;w)+
c  ptw (t+ 1)  (1  pt) 2u (t+ 2; pt+1;w) =
 c+ ptw (t) + c  ptw (t+ 1) ;
where the last equality follows from u (t+ 1; pt+1;w) = u (t+ 2; pt+1;w) ; constraint (5)
at t+ 1: Constraint (6) is therefore satised since for every t = 0; : : : ; T   2;
w (t) = w (t+ 1) +
c (1  )
pt
:
Thus, the contract w dened in Proposition 1 solves the principals problem.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let
 
wh; w`

be an optimal mechanism and suppose that w` (t) 6= w  t; p`0 for some t;
and/or w` (G) 6= w  G; p`0 ; where w  p`0 is the optimal contract dened in Proposition
1.
Let w^` denote the contract which is identical to w
 
p`0

except that we set w^` (B) to
satisfy
u
 
0; p`0; w^
`

= u
 
0; p`0;w
`

:
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Among all the contracts that are suitable for p`0; w
  p`0 has the lowest payments in
state G: Therefore, we have w^` (t) 6 w` (t) for every t; with strict inequality at t = 0;
w^` (G) 6 w` (G) ; and w^` (B) > w` (B) : Clearly, the mechanism w^` is suitable for p`0:
We now show that
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

> u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
`

: (18)
In fact, we have
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`
  u  0; ph0 ; w^` =
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`
  u  0; p`0;w`  u  0; ph0 ; w^`  u  0; p`0; w^` = 
ph0   p`0
 

T 1P
t=0
(1  )t tw` (t) + (1  )T T 1w` (G)  T 1w` (B)

 
 
ph0   p`0
 

T 1P
t=0
(1  )t tw^` (t) + (1  )T T 1w^` (G)  T 1w^` (B)

=
 
ph0   p`0
 

T 1P
t=0
(1  )t t  w` (t)  w^` (t)+
(1  )T T 1  w` (G)  w^` (G)  T 1  w` (B)  w^` (B)i > 0:
This and the fact that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible imply
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

> u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
`

: (19)
Notice also that
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> ph0w^
` (0) ; (20)
since w^` (0) < w` (0) and
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible.
We now construct a contract w^h such that the mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

is incentive com-
patible and
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h

:
Clearly, this means that the original mechanism
 
wh; w`

is not optimal.
The exact form of the contract w^h depends on the contract wh: We need to distinguish
among three di¤erent cases. In what follows, " denotes a small positive number.
(i) First suppose that wh (t) = w
 
t; ph0

for every t and wh (G) = w
 
G; ph0

= 0:
Notice that
wh (0) = w
 
0; ph0

< w
 
0; p`0

= w^` (0) < w` (0) ;
and, thus,
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> ph0w` (0) > ph0wh (0) ; (21)
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where the rst inequality follows from the fact that under
 
wh; w`

the high type does not
have an incentive to choose the contract w` and guess state G in the rst period.
In this case we let w^h be identical to wh except that we set
w^h (B) = wh (B)  ":
It follows from inequalities (19)-(21) that for " su¢ ciently small the new mechanism 
w^h; w^`

is incentive compatible.
(ii) Suppose now that there exists a period t such that the constraint
u
 
t; pht ;w
h

> u
 
t+ 1; pht ;w
h

(22)
is satised with strict inequality. In this case let t^ denote the largest integer for which the
above constraint is not binding. If t^ > 0; we let
w^h
 
t^

= wh
 
t^
  ";
and
w^h (t) = wh (0)  t^ t"
for t = 0; : : : ; t^ 1: The remaining payments of w^h are equal to the corresponding payments
of wh.
If t^ = 0; we let w^h be identical to wh except that we set
w^h (0) = wh (0)  ":
For " su¢ ciently small, the contract w^h is suitable for ph0 . It follows from inequalities
(19) and (20) that under the contract
 
w^h; w^`

the high type does not have an incentive to
choose the contract w^` (provided that " is small enough). It is also obvious that the low
type does not have an incentive to choose the contract w^h (every payment of w^h is weakly
smaller than the corresponding payment of wh). We conclude that for " su¢ ciently small
the mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

is incentive compatible.
(iii) Finally, suppose that constraint (22) is binding in every period. In this case we
must have wh (G) > 0 (if wh (G) = 0 and all the constraints in (22) are binding then we
are in case (i)). We let
w^h (G) = wh (G)  ";
and
w^h (t) = wh (t)  T 1 t"
for t = 0; : : : ; T   1: Furthermore, w^h (B) = wh (B). Again, for " su¢ ciently small the
mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

is incentive compatible (the proof is identical to the proof of case (ii)).
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Proof of Lemma 3.
Before proceeding with the proof of the lemma, we need to establish a preliminary
result. Given a contract w; recall the denition of a (0;w) in equation (14) in the proof of
Lemma 1.
Claim 1 Suppose the contract w is suitable for some p0 2 (0; 1) : Then a (0;w) > 0:
Proof.
Fix a contract w: Recall from equation (15) that for every p 2 [0; 1] ;
u (0; p;w) = a (0;w) + b (0;w) p:
Thus, a (0;w) coincides with u (0; 0;w) ; the agents expected utility in period 0 when
his belief is 0 and he acquires and reveals the signal in every period. Then we have
a (0;w) = u (0; 0;w) =  c  1 +  + : : :+ T 1+ T 1w (B) :
Fix p0 2 (0; 1) and consider the following problem:
min
w>0
w (B)
s.t. w is suitable for p0:
It is immediate to check that the optimal contract w (p0) solves the above problem.
We conclude that if w is suitable for p0; then
a (0;w) > a (0;w (p0)) = c

1
 (1  p0)   1

> 0:
This concludes the proof of the claim.
We now continue with the proof of Lemma 3.
Suppose that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible. It follows from a
 
0;wh

>
0 (the contract wh is suitable for ph0); and the fact that the high type does not have an
incentive to choose w` and guess state G in the rst period,
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= a
 
0;wh

+ b
 
0;wh

ph0 > ph0w` (0) ;
that
u
 
0; p`0;w
h

= a
 
0;wh

+ b
 
0;wh

p`0 > p
`
0w
` (0) :
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Since the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible the low type does not have an
incentive to choose wh and acquire and reveal the signal in every period. Therefore, we
have
u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> u
 
0; p`0;w
h

> p`0w
` (0) :
Proof of Lemma 4.
We rst show that if
 
wh; w`

is an optimal mechanism, then
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= ph0w
h (0) : (23)
Suppose that the mechanism is incentive compatible and u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> ph0w
h (0) : We
distinguish between two cases.
First suppose that
u
 
0; p`0;w
`

= p`0w
h (0) : (24)
We know from Lemma 3 that u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> p`0w
` (0) : This and equality (24) imply
wh (0) > w` (0) : Furthermore, it follows from a
 
0;w`

> 0 (see Claim 1) and equality
(24) that u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

< ph0w
h (0) : Recall that u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> ph0w
h (0) : Thus, we have
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> ph0w
` (0) and u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

: Clearly, we can lower the payment
wh (B) by a small amount and the new mechanism is still incentive compatible. This shows
that the original mechanism
 
wh; w`

is not optimal.
Thus, let us assume that
u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> p`0w
h (0) : (25)
Consider now a new contract w^h for the high type which is identical to wh except that
we set
w^h (0) = wh (0) + "
for some small positive " and choose w^h (B) < wh (B) such that
u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h

= u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

:
Clearly, for " su¢ ciently small the contract w^h is suitable for ph0 : Also, inequality (25)
implies that for " small enough, u
 
0; p`0; w^
`

> p`0w^
h (0) : Finally, for every  2 0;
u
 
; p`0;w
h

> u
 
; p`0; w^
h

:
The proof of this inequality is identical to the proof of inequality (18), so we omit the
details.
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Notice that the new mechanism
 
w^h; w`

is incentive compatible for " su¢ ciently small,
and all the constraints in which the low type lies about his type are satised with strict
inequality. Also recall from Lemma 3 that u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> p`0w
` (0) : Therefore, we can
decrease the payment w` (B) by a small amount and the new mechanism is still incentive
compatible. But then the original mechanism
 
wh; w`

cannot be optimal (notice that, by
construction, the mechanisms
 
wh; w`

and
 
w^h; w`

have the same expected cost).
Next, we show that if
 
wh; w`

is an optimal mechanism, then wh (0) = w` (0) =
w
 
0; p`0

:
Suppose that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is optimal. Equality (23) and the fact that 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible immediately imply wh (0) > w` (0) : By contradiction,
suppose that wh (0) > w` (0) :
First, assume that u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

: Suppose that the principal o¤ers the
mechanism
 
w`; w`

; i.e. the same contract w` to both types. Since
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

= u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= ph0w
h (0) > ph0w
` (0) ;
the contract w` is suitable for both types. However, notice that under the contract w` each
type strictly prefers to acquire and reveal the signal in every period rather than guess state
G in period 0: Thus, if we lower the payment w` (B) by a small amount, the new contract
will remain suitable for both types. By construction, the mechanisms
 
wh; w`

and
 
w`; w`

have the same expected cost. But then the original mechanism
 
wh; w`

cannot be optimal.
To conclude the proof, suppose that
 
wh; w`

is optimal, wh (0) > w` (0) ; and u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

>
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

: Notice that it cannot be the case that wh (G) = 0 and wh satises the con-
straint
u
 
t; pht ;w
h

> u
 
t+ 1; pht ;w
h

with equality in every period. If this were the case, then wh (0) = w
 
0; ph0

< w
 
0; p`0

=
w` (0) :
If the above constraint is satised with strict inequality for some t; then we construct a
new contract w^h as in case (ii) in the proof of Proposition 2. Otherwise, if all the constraints
are binding, then we construct a new contract w^h as in case (iii) in the proof of Proposition
2.
The fact that u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

> u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

implies that for " su¢ ciently small, the new
mechanism
 
w^h; w`

is incentive compatible. Also, the expected cost of
 
w^h; w`

is strictly
smaller than the expected cost of the original mechanism
 
wh; w`

which, therefore, cannot
be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Given a contract wh and a prior p 2 (0; 1) ; we dene
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
 
p; wh

= u
 
0; p;wh
  u (0; p; w) =
p

T 1P
t=0
(1  )t t  wh (t)  w (t)+ (1  )T T 1  wh (G)  w (G)+
(1  p) T 1  wh (B)  w (B) :
We start with two preliminary observations. First, if a mechanism
 
wh; w`

is optimal,
then wh (B) 6 w (B) : The proof of this result is by contradiction. Notice that if
 
wh; w`

is optimal, then 
 
ph0 ; w
h

= 0: This and wh (B) > w (B) would imply 
 
p`0; w
h

> 0; and,
thus,
u
 
0; p`;w`

> u
 
0; p`;wh

> u
 
0; p`; w

:
We conclude that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is not optimal, since it is more expensive
than the incentive compatible mechanism ( w; w) :
Second, it is immediate to see that if
 
wh; w`

is optimal and wh (B) = w (B) ; then the
mechanism ( w; w) is also optimal.
We are now ready to prove that ( w; w) is optimal when p`0 2

ph1 ; p
h
0

: It is enough
to show that u
 
0; p`0;w
`

> u
 
0; p`0; w

for any mechanism
 
wh; w`

that satises: (i)
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= u
 
0; ph0 ; w

; (ii) wh (0) = w (0) ; and (iii) wh (B) < w (B) :
Let 1 denote the strategy under which the agent shirks in the rst period and acquires
and reveals the signal in every other period t > 0: Using wh (0) = w (0) we can rewrite

 
ph0 ; w
h

= 0 as
ph0 (1  )

T 1P
t=1
(1  )t 1 t  wh (t)  w (t)+ (1  )T 1 T 1  wh (G)  w (G)+ 
1  ph0

T 1
 
wh (B)  w (B) = 0:
We divide both sides by
 
1  ph0

and obtain
ph1

T 1P
t=1
(1  )t 1 t  wh (t)  w (t)+ (1  )T 1 T 1  wh (G)  w (G)+ 
1  ph1

T 1
 
wh (B)  w (B) = 0:
Recall that wh (B) < w (B) and p`0 > ph1 : This and the above equality imply
0 6 p`0

T 1P
t=1
(1  )t 1 t  wh (t)  w (t)+ (1  )T 1 T 1  wh (G)  w (G)+ 
1  p`0

T 1
 
wh (B)  w (B) = u  1; p`0;wh  u  1; p`0; w : (26)
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Finally,
u
 
0; p`0; w

= u
 
1; p`0; w

6 u
 
1; p`0;w
h

6 u
 
0; p`0;w
`

;
where the equality follows from the fact constraint (5) is binding when the contract is w;
t = 0 and the prior is p`0 (notice that u
 
1; p`0; w

= u
 
1; p`0; w

), while the last inequality
holds because
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible.
We now turn to uniqueness. Suppose that p`0 2
 
ph1 ; p
h
0

: One can immediately check
that in this case inequality (26) is strict. Thus, if
 
wh; w`

is optimal, then wh (B) = w (B) :
It is possible to show that
max
20
u
 
; p`0;w
h

> u
 
0; p`0; w

for any contract wh that satises (i) u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= u
 
0; ph0 ; w

; (ii) wh (0) = w (0) ; and
(iii) wh (B) = w (B) : For brevity, we omit the proof of this claim. Of course, this shows
that when p`1 > p
h
0 there is no optimal mechanism other that ( w; w).
It remains to show that ( w; w) is not optimal when p`0 < p
h
1 : Consider the mechanism 
wh; w`

; dened as follows. Let " denote a small positive number. The contract wh is
identical to w except that we set
wh (1) = w (1) + ";
wh (B) = w (B)  ph0 (1 )
(1 ph0)T 2
":
The contract w` is identical to w except that we set
w` (B) = w (B)  ":
It is easy to check that u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= u
 
0; ph0 ; w

and that, for " su¢ ciently small, wh
is suitable for ph0 :
The fact that p`0 < p
h
1 implies that for every  2 0;
u
 
; p`0; w

> u
 
; p`0;w
h

:
By denition,
u
 
0; p`0; w

> p`0 w (0) = p
`
0w
` (0) = p`0w
h (0) :
We conclude that for " su¢ ciently small the mechanism
 
w`; wh

is incentive compatible.
Therefore, ( w; w) is not optimal.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
We start with a preliminary observation. If
 
w^h; w^`

is an optimal mechanism, then
u
 
1; 1; w^h

> u
 
1; 1; w^`

; (27)
where one should recall that u
 
t; 1; w^k

; t = 0; : : : ; T   1; denotes the agents expected
utility, computed in period t; when his beliefs is one, he acquires and reveals the signal in
every period t0 > t; and the contract is w^k: Inequality (27) follows from w^h (0) = w^` (0) =
w
 
0; p`0

; and the fact that given the mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

; it is not protable for the type
pk0; k = h; `; to choose w^
k0 ; k0 6= k; and acquire and reveal the signal in every period.
Let
 
w^h; w^`

be an optimal contract (recall that there exists a solution to the principals
problem) and let  > 0 be equal to
 = u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h
  u  1; ph0 ; w^h :
This and the constraints
u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h

= ph0w^
h (0) = ph0w
  0; p`0 (28)
have the following implications:
w^h (B) = w
 
B; ph0

+
(1  ) 
1  ph0

T 1
; (29)
and
u
 
1; 1; w^h

=
w
 
0; p`0


  c
ph0
  
ph0
: (30)
From equations (28)-(30) we can derive the values of u
 
0; p`0; w^
h

and u
 
1; p`0; w^
h

;
which for brevity we refer to as v0 and v1; respectively:
u
 
0; p`0; w^
h

=

ph0   p`0
ph0
 
 c+ c+ (1  ) 
1  ph0


!
+ p`0w
  0; p`0 := v0;
and
u
 
1; p`0; w^
h

= p`0

w
 
0; p`0
  c
ph0
  
ph0

+
 
1  p`0
 c+ (1  ) 
1  ph0


!
:= v1:
Thus, vt; t = 0; 1; denotes the utility of the low type when he chooses the contract w^h
and he acquires and reveals the signal in every period t0 > t (before t the agent shirks and
announces message B).
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Recall from the denition of u (T; p;w) in equation (3), that u
 
T; 1; w^h

is equal to
w^h(G)

: For every t = 2; : : : ; T; we have
u
 
1; 1; w^h

=
t 1X
t0=1
(1  )t0 1 t0 1  w^h (t0)  c+ (1  )t 1 t 1u  t; 1; w^h :
This and the fact that for every t; w^h (t) 6 w
(0;p`0)
t
imply
tu
 
t; 1; w^h

> 1
(1 )t 1
h
w
 
0; p`0
 
1  Pt 1t0=1 (1  )t0 1 
c
ph0
+ c
Pt 1
t0=1 (1  )t
0 1 t
0   
ph0
i
:
Finally, using this inequality and the denition of w^h (B) in equation (29) we have that
for every t = 2; : : : ; T;
tu
 
t; p`0; w^
h

= tp`0u
 
t; 1; w^h

+ t
 
1  p`0

u
 
t; 0; w^h

>
p`0
(1 )t 1
h
w
 
0; p`0
 
1  Pt 1t0=1 (1  )t0 1 
c
ph0
+ c
Pt 1
t0=1 (1  )t
0 1 t
0   
ph0
i
+ 
1  p`0
  c  t + : : :+ T 1+ T 1w (B) + (1 )
(1 ph0)T 1

:= vt:
Therefore, for t = 2; : : : ; T; vt is a lower bound to the utility that the lower type can
obtain when he chooses the contract w^h and he starts to acquire and reveal the signal in
period t (he shirks and sends message B before t).
We conclude that under the optimal mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

; the utility of the low type is
bounded below by
u
 
0; p`0; w^
`

> max fv0; : : : ; vTg : (31)
We are now ready to construct an optimal mechanism
 
wh; w`

which satises the
conditions in Proposition 4. We set w` = w^`; wh (0) = w^h (0) ; and wh (B) = w^h (B) : The
rest of the contract wh is constructed using an algorithm that involves T steps.
In step 1; we set wh (t) = w
 
t; p`0

; for t = 2; : : : ; T   1; and wh (G) = w  G; p`0 = 0:
Also, we choose wh (1) to solve
u
 
1; 1;wh

=
w
 
0; p`0


  c
ph0
  
ph0
= u
 
1; 1; w^h

: (32)
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It follows from inequality (27) and the way the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is designed in step
1 that the solution wh (1) to the equation (32) must be weakly greater than w
 
1; p`0

:16
If the solution wh (1) is weakly smaller than
w(0;p`0)

; then the algorithm stops at step 1:
Otherwise, we set wh (1) =
w(0;p`0)

and move to step 2:
Next, we describe step t = 2; : : : ; T   1: We set wh (t0) = w
(0;p`0)
t
0 for t0 < t; wh (t0) =
w
 
t0; p`0

for t0 = t+ 1; : : : ; T   1, and wh (G) = w  G; p`0 = 0: Finally, we choose wh (t)
to solve the equation (32). If the solution wh (t) is weakly smaller than
w(0;p`0)
t
; then
the algorithm stops at step t: Otherwise we set wh (t) =
w(0;p`0)
t
and move to step t + 1:
Notice that the fact that the algorithm reaches step t implies that the solution wh (t) to
the equation (32) must be greater than w
 
t; p`0

:
Finally, in step T; we set wh (t) =
w(0;p`0)
t
for every t = 1; : : : ; T   1; and choose wh (G)
to solve the equation (32). It is easy to check that if the algorithm reaches step T then the
solution wh (G) is positive and weakly smaller than
wh (T   1)  c
phT 1
=
w
 
0; p`0

T 1
  c
phT 1
:
We now show that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is incentive compatible and
max
20
u
 
; p`0;w
h

= max fv0; : : : ; vTg : (33)
Given inequality (31), this is clearly enough to conclude that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is optimal.
It is immediate to see that the contracts wh and w` are suitable for ph0 and p
`
0, respec-
tively.17 And since wh (0) = w` (0), it is not protable for the type pk0; k = h; `; to choose
w^k
0
; k0 6= k; and guess in the rst period that the state is G: Also, by construction,
u
 
0; ph0 ;w
h

= u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h

> u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
`

= u
 
0; ph0 ;w
`

:
It remains to check equality (33). Suppose that the algorithm used to construct wh stops
at step t^ = 1; : : : ; T: After t^; the payments of wh in state G coincide with the payments
of w
 
p`0

and wh
 
t^

> w
 
t^; p`0

: Thus, the low type does not have an incentive to shirk
16The solution wh (1) must be strictly greater than w
 
1; p`0

if  is equal to zero.
17Notice that if for some t; u
 
t; pht ;w
h

> u
 
t; pht ;w
h

and wh (t) = wh (t+ 1) ; then it must be the
case that u
 
t+ 1; pht+1;w
h

> u
 
t+ 2; pht+1;w
h

:
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from period t^ on. Formally, if  2 0 is a strategy under which the low type shirks in period
t > t^; then there exists another strategy 0 2 0 with u  0; p`0;wh > u  ; p`0;wh :
Let us now restrict attention to the strategies in 0 under which the low type works in
every period t > t^: If  is a strategy under which the agent works in period t and shirks in
some period t0; t < t0 < t^; then  is a weakly dominated strategy. To see this, consider the
strategy . We must be able to nd a period ~t < t^  1; such that the low type works in ~t
and shirks in ~t + 1: Let 0 be a strategy which is identical to  except that the low type
shirks in ~t and works in ~t+1: At the beginning of period ~t; the low type has the same belief,
say p; both when he uses  and when he uses 0: Thus, the di¤erence between the agents
continuation payo¤s of the strategies  and 0, computed at the beginning of period ~t, is
equal to
 c+ pwh  ~t+ c  pwh  ~t+ 1 =  c+ c 6 0;
where the equality follows from wh
 
~t+ 1

=
wh(~t)

: Thus, u
 
0; p`0;w
h

> u
 
; p`0;w
h

:
To sum up, given the contract wh; it is optimal for the low type to use one of the
following strategies: 0; : : : ; t^: For t = 0; : : : ; t; t denotes the strategy under which the
low type starts to acquire and reveal the signal in period t (the agent shirks and sends
message B before t). Recall that wh (t) =
w(0;p`0)
t
for every t < t^ since we are considering
the case in which the algorithm stops at step t^: Thus, for every t = 0; : : : ; t^; we have
u
 
t; p`0;w
h

= tu
 
t; p`0;w
h

= vt:
Therefore, we conclude that the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is optimal.
Finally, we show that wh (1) > w
 
1; p`0

= w` (1) : This implies wh (B) < w` (B) : In
fact, if wh (B) > w` (B) then the mechanism
 
wh; w`

is not incentive compatible (recall
that wh (t) > w` (t) for every t; with a strict inequality at t = 1; and wh (G) > w` (G)).
We need to distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that p`0 < p
h
1 : If the contract
wh constructed using the above algorithm is such that wh (1) = w
 
1; p`0

; then it is optimal
to o¤er the same contract to both types. But this contradicts Proposition 3.
Second, suppose that p`0 = p
h
1 : It is possible to show that if p
`
0 =
ph0 (1 )t
ph0 (1 )t+1 ph0
for some
t = 1; 2; : : : ; then there exists an optimal mechanism
 
w^h; w^`

such that
u
 
0; ph0 ; w^
h
  u  1; ph0 ; w^h = 0: (34)
For brevity, we omit the proof of this claim. We then start from
 
w^h; w^`

and con-
struct an optimal mechanism using the above algorithm. Equality (34) guarantees that the
payment wh (1) identied in step 1 is strictly greater than w
 
1; p`0

(see footnote 16).
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